Kuwait Times

Published Date: July 12, 2009
By David B Roberts

There is a fine line between imprudent and impractical prognostication and necessary contemplation of future events. Add in the thorny and often emotive issue of nuclear weapons and a measured assessment of what might be becomes even more difficult. Yet those living on the Arab side of the Arabian Gulf must engage with the possibility of Iran attaining nuclear weapons and the ensuing geopolitical fallout. From Iraq down the eastern half of Saudi Arabia to Bahrain and from Iran itself to the Mediterranean,
the spectre of insidious Iranian inspired Shiite 5th columnists pervades swathes of the Gulf.

It is certainly true that both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have witnessed significant Shiite rioting this year, yet fears that these Shiite protestors operate at the behest of Iran are exaggerated. Rather, these groups are often just demanding better treatment or equal rights and opportunities within their nation-state. Crucially, in the Gulf the forces of nationalism are strong. Saddam Hussein's largely Shiite army did not switch sides in the attritional Iran-Iraq war. So too was the feared automatic kowtowi
ng of Iraq's newly emancipated Shiite leadership to Iran simply has not materialized.

There's some truth in the fact that Iran does support Shiite groups around the region that often challenge the Sunni status quo. For example, in Lebanon where Tehran would appear to have more of a say in local politics and influence with allies, Hezbollah. Shiite communities in the Gulf that claim to be oppressed will no doubt feel emboldened were Iran to becomes a nuclear state.

In Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirate the Shiite communities are wholly integrated and a part of the political structure. But in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, for instance, they remain troubled populations with long standing grievances against their governments. Saudi Arabia, with its pervasive security forces, its strong grip on the media, an overwhelmingly Sunni population as a whole and with the iron will never to cede its oil-rich Eastern province, would appear to be in a strong position.

As for Bahrain, the US presence there is formidable but primarily acts as an external deterrent and defense; internal issues rest with the Bahraini authorities. There are, therefore, potentially real concerns in Manama, with its relatively disenfranchised Shiite majority, of their ability to cope with a buoyed and inspired large-scale protests.

Overall, there is precious little that most Arab states in the region could do were Iran to obtain WMD. The key exception to this is Saudi Arabia, the custodian of the two holiest places in Islam, and the leader, as they wish to be seen, of Muslims around the world. The proselytizing 1979 Iranian Revolution sought to wrest this title from Riyadh and Tehran's joining of the elite nuclear club would offer another stiff challenge by significantly elevating Iran's international profile.

Indeed, it is difficult to see how Saudi Arabia could react to this without obtaining a bomb themselves. If this were done it would most likely be bought 'off the shelf' from close ally Pakistan and used covertly as Israel does to mitigate the worst of the international fall-out. Yet, unlikely and extreme as this sounds, this may well be exactly what Riyadh feels that it needs to do to counter what may be perceived to be a loss of prestige, region-wide Shiite empowerment and even encirclement.

To the north Riyadh sees Iran supporter Syria as well as several Tehran sponsored proxy forces. Iran getting the bomb would immediately end any notions of 'flipping' Syria into the Saudi-Egypt camp, were that even likely in the first place. To their East they see Bahrain's troubles, their own rebellious Shiite-dominated Eastern province and Iran itself. To the South they see Yemen and strong Zaidi Shiism.

Discussing the implications of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons presupposes that neither Israel nor America will preemptively intervene. Despite the ugly rhetoric, it's unlikely that Tehran would nuke Israel and then face retaliation. American forces and interests in the Gulf would most likely be subject to more Iranian pressure. Yet, as hard as Iran pushed, the smaller Gulf states would no doubt push equally hard towards America and the West, more or less exactly what Iran does not want.

In short, there are no guarantees that Iran would strategically gain from obtaining nuclear weapons. Like India's procurement which forced vastly weaker Pakistan to secure WMD thus levelling the playing field, it could simply spur regional neighbors to extreme reactions to redress the balance.