Kuwait Times

Published Date: September 17, 2008

Reports of Pakistani forces opposing US military incursions across the border from Pakistan have now been denied by officials in both Islamabad and at the Pentagon. Pakistani sources told Reuters on Sept 15 that US helicopters were fired upon by Pakistani troops near Angur Abba in South Waziristan, and turned back while attempting to cross the border under the cover of darkness. The same day the Pakistani English-language daily Dawn reported that Pakistani fighter jets had scrambled and intercepted a US
spy plane" (this could have been an unmanned aerial vehicle) in or near North Waziristan that then returned to Afghanistan.

Regardless of the truth to these now-denied claims, the chance that rising tensions between Washington and Islamabad may manifest themselves in the form of military encounters in the air above the Afghan-Pakistani border region is indeed cause for concern. Islamabad is trapped between the need to get control over its own jihadist uprising and the need to show its domestic population that it is standing up to increasingly overt unilateral US military action inside its territory. Opposing the primary vector
of these actions - unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), fighter jets and helicopters - is one way Pakistan can attempt to push back against the United States and demonstrate its resolve to both Washington and its own people, whether it chooses to do so overtly or through proxies.

The nature of US intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and special operations forces operations in Pakistan makes it difficult to effectively defend against, however. Constant monitoring by UAVs, bombings by aircraft from along the border and lightning late-night raids across the border in high terrain present a number of defensive challenges in an area where Islamabad already struggles to enforce its writ. The Pakistani military is unlikely to bring its heaviest air defense hardware to bear
in any bid to deter such incursions. Already fairly weakly equipped, these forces must remain largely dedicated to defenses focused on India. Given the terrain, Pakistan's heavier air defense assets would also be difficult to bring to bear beyond very isolated point-defense roles. And given their short supply, the Pakistani military would likely be hesitant to put these defenses at undo risk of being destroyed.

More dispersed efforts using gunfire (Pakistan does retain anti-aircraft artillery) and Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) would be problematic as well. Using this sort of defense effectively would require a comprehensive deployment along the border, something Pakistani forces probably do not have the bandwidth for at this time. Even if it did, this picket would still be very limited in capability given the limitations of both older MANPADS, anti-aircraft artillery and crude sensors in the rough te
rrain.

Though it could help with challenging the United States while maintaining deniability, the idea of dispersing MANPADS to proxies is also problematic. So much has been done since 9/11 to secure these stockpiles in places like Pakistan that even Islamabad might hesitate to do so - especially to third parties they do not control, since there would be the risk that MANPADS could be used to bring down a civilian airliner, and that Islamabad could be found out as the source of the weapon.

Instead, Pakistan could now be running combat air patrols with its F-16s over the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) if there is any truth at all to the Dawn report. Pakistan has yet to secure a deal with the United States to buy new Block 50/52 F-16s, so its patrols are being run by F-16s still operating with the AN/APG-66 radar from the much older Block 15 configuration. They are not ideal, and they are certainly unable to hold up against U.S. and NATO patrols, but they are better positioned to s
pot inbound helicopters and ISR flights and give them a scare.

In most cases (except when supporting troops already on the ground in Pakistan), the US abort criteria will likely generally be set low, since the United States is not interested in losing aircraft inside Pakistan But Islamabad is not interested in losing aircraft, either. Already facing a hostile US Congress over the delivery of the newer F-16s the Pakistani air force wants, Pakistan cannot risk losing the F-16s it does have. This is not simply because deteriorating relations with Washington have, in the
past, cut off Islamabad's F-16s from outside support, but because of a profound military disadvantage against India. New Delhi continues to field new Su-30MKI "Flankers," which even the newer F-16s might have difficulty handling.

The obvious caveat here is that shooting down a manned US aircraft - intentionally and directly or at the hands of a proxy - is an enormous line to cross for Islamabad. Right now, it is simply important for Pakistan to demonstrate to its domestic audience a commitment to defending its own borders, while at the same time showing resolve to Washington as the Pentagon formulates a new strategy for Afghanistan. Things would likely have to escalate significantly for Islamabad to consider truly working to bring
down US aircraft. But while their options in terms of air defense along the border are extremely limited, Pakistan continues to hold the logistical keys to US and NATO operations in Afghanistan - an extremely strong lever in the search for some sort of accommodation.- Stratfor